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I. INTRODUCTION 
Most accounts of criminal responsibility depend on the claim—in 
somewhat different guises—that the paradigm subject of criminal law is 
an individual with rational agency.  In other words, she is a subject whose 
conscious acts, or whose actions expressing her constitutive psychology 
or settled traits, attitudes, or dispositions, in some sense express her 
rational self.  Moreover, these standard accounts of what it is to be a 
subject of criminal law assume that these features of agency can be clearly 
 
* Nicola Lacey is School Professor of Law, Gender and Social Policy at the London School of 
Economics.  This is an edited version of the annual George and Margaret Barrock Lecture in Criminal 
Law, delivered at Marquette University Law School in October 2015.  I am most grateful to Jules 
Holroyd for comments on a draft of this Article; to Mark Rucci for research assistance; to the audience 
at the Barrock Lecture for their questions; and to Joseph Kearney and the editors of the Law Review 
for their editorial work on the Article.  
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distinguished from features of a subject’s situation, environment, history, 
or circumstances.  Circumstances of poverty or of wealth; our experiences 
of privilege or of disadvantages such as racism, violence, or sexual abuse; 
the quality of our parenting and education: all of these undoubtedly shape 
our lives in fundamental ways.  But, while operating causally on us in 
various ways, these external factors do not, it is argued, define us as 
agents—as subjects of criminal law. 
In this Article, I will argue that this distinction between environment 
and agency is in fact more problematic than it first appears.  Cases in 
which environment or socialization fundamentally affects the judgment 
and reasoning of the individual subject pose, I shall argue, a real challenge 
to the basis for the practices of responsibility attribution on which legal 
judgment depends.  Such cases also put in question the standard 
assumption that questions of responsibility can be analytically separated 
from questions of criminalization.  The clue to meeting this challenge, I 
will argue, is to recognize that the criteria for criminal responsibility must 
be articulated with an understanding of the role and functions of criminal 
law.1  And this in turn, I shall suggest, underlines an important distinction 
between the contours of responsibility in legal and in moral contexts.  It 
also has significant implications for method in criminal law scholarship. 
In what follows, I shall set out a standard model of what it is to be 
criminally responsible, encompassing the engagement of standard powers 
of self-control and understanding.  I shall then go on to consider the ways 
in which external factors may affect the extent to which these volitional 
 
1.  In making this argument, I am of course revisiting a well-travelled terrain, but I seek 
to recast the issue by insisting that the question of criminal (as distinct from moral) 
responsibility cannot be separated from that of the rationale for criminalization, and hence 
cannot be resolved within the terms of the free will/determinism debate.  For key contributions 
arguing for and against the proposition that environmental factors can or should undermine 
attributions of criminal responsibility, see MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL 
THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW chs. 12 & 13 (1997); David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the 
Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1976); Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”: 
Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW 
& INEQ. 9 (1985); Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1091 (1985); 
Stephen J. Morse, Severe Environmental Deprivation (aka RSB): A Tragedy, Not a Defense, 2 
ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 147 (2011) [hereinafter Morse, Severe Environmental Deprivation]; 
Stephen J. Morse, Deprivation and Desert, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 114 (William C. Heffernan & John 
Kleinig eds., 2000) [hereinafter Morse, Deprivation and Desert]; Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight 
of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247 (1976); Paul H. 
Robinson, Are We Responsible for Who We Are? The Challenge for Criminal Law Theory in 
the Defenses of Coercive Indoctrination and “Rotten Social Background,” 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. 
L. REV. 53 (2011).  For further discussion, see THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, FREEDOM AND 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 333–43, 356–414 (2014). 
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and cognitive conditions are met.  In relation to the volitional condition 
of responsibility, I shall consider criminal law’s difficulties with the 
defenses of duress of circumstances and of necessity as threatening to a 
model of individual responsibility which is functional to law’s regulatory 
ambitions: to admit a defense which in effect allows the defendant to rely 
on her own interpretation of what is required may seem to run counter to 
the very rationale of criminal law.  I shall then go on to consider external 
factors which shape the cognitive rather than the volitional conditions for 
responsibility.  While probably the standard example here is that of 
ignorance of law,2 I consider a broader set of cases in which “implicit bias” 
or “miscognition” potentially undermines the cognitive basis for criminal 
responsibility.  These biases themselves proceed from deeply embedded 
aspects of experience or education, and they have the power to shape the 
subject’s reasoning process in such a way as to call into question whether 
she genuinely enjoyed a fair opportunity to conform her conduct to the 
precepts of the criminal law.  In each of these contexts, I conclude that 
external conditions indeed pose real challenges—challenges moreover 
which derive from our social practices of mutual interpretation—to the 
capacity of the concept of criminal responsibility to fulfill its standard role 
in legitimating and coordinating the imposition of criminalizing power.  
Further, they call into question the idea that there is a clear definitional 
line between the individual subject of criminal law and her social 
environment.  
In the final part of the Article, I will move on to consider ways in 
which the resulting challenge to criminal law’s legitimacy might be met.  
To many criminal law theorists, the issue is essentially one of moral 
philosophy: responsible agency being a moral category, the task of the 
criminal law theorist is simply to delineate the conditions of responsibility 
and to come to the best judgment possible about whether they have been 
met.  By contrast, I shall argue that the normative question whether the 
conditions of criminal responsibility have been met cannot be answered 
in the abstract.  Rather, our deliberations here must proceed in the light 
of the meaning and social functions of criminalization as a complex social 
practice, itself located within a broader set of understandings about the 
proper relationship between individual and state.  This relationship—like 
the institutions through which it is realized and implemented and the 
interests which shape its development—changes over time.  And this 
implies that the question of where we should draw the line around 
 
2.  For a robust subjectivist case for allowing such a defense, see Andrew Ashworth, 
Ignorance of the Criminal Law, and Duties to Avoid It, 74 MOD. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
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responsibility is itself historically contingent.  This is not to say that, 
within modern western legal systems, there has been no core 
understanding of responsibility.  But it is to insist that the question of 
where responsible agency for the purposes of criminal law begins and 
ends in difficult cases such as those already canvassed is a matter for social 
evaluation.  It is, at root, a decision which depends on a judgment about 
the proper purposes of criminal law and about the broader obligations of 
the state, rather than a question which can be determined by an 
ahistorical metaphysics or, to be sure, by sciences such as psychology or 
neuroscience.3  In conclusion, I shall draw out the implications of this 
analysis for the methodology of criminal law theory and for how we 
should conceive the relationship between criminal law scholarship and 
historical and social scientific work on the criminal process more 
generally. 
II. CONCEPTUALIZING THE RESPONSIBLE SUBJECT OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 
So let us consider, first, the standard account of what it is to be a 
responsible subject of criminal law. 
It is widely accepted in the criminal law theory of modern western 
societies that the legitimation of the state’s imposition of criminalizing 
power in relation to individual human beings depends upon that power’s 
being invoked in response to only the responsible acts of an agent with 
certain minimum capacities.4  These capacities consist in volitional and 
cognitive powers: a basic ability to exercise self-control or self-direction, 
a basic ability to understand the facts and circumstances bearing on 
action, and a basic ability to predict and assess the consequences 
following on from our conduct.  Without basic capacities of these two 
kinds, we are arguably not even candidates to be subjects of criminal law: 
rather, we are outsiders to the special form of communication which 
constitutes the criminal law.5  But to have this baseline of capacity is not 
 
3.  This argument is developed at greater length in Nicola Lacey, Responsibility Without 
Consciousness, 36 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 219 (2016) [hereinafter Lacey, Responsibility 
Without Consciousness], and see more generally NICOLA LACEY, IN SEARCH OF CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: IDEAS, INTERESTS AND INSTITUTIONS (2016) [hereinafter LACEY, IN 
SEARCH OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY]. 
4.  See H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT 
AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1 (2d ed. 2008). 
5.  See R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME: RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY IN THE 
CRIMINAL LAW (2007) [hereinafter DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME]; R.A. DUFF, 
PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY (2001) [hereinafter DUFF, PUNISHMENT, 
COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY]; R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS (1986). 
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in itself sufficient for an attribution of criminal responsibility.  Rather, 
these cognitive and volitional capacities need to have been engaged in 
relevant ways at the time of the relevant conduct: we knew or were aware 
of the relevant circumstances surrounding our acts; we foresaw the likely 
consequences of our conduct; we would have been able, had we so chosen, 
to act otherwise.  But while a wide range of facts, psychological and other, 
will bear upon the “existence” or not of these engaged capacities, that 
“existence” is not itself a straightforward matter of fact.  Rather, as 
H.L.A. Hart influentially argued in his classic Prolegomenon to the 
Principles of Punishment,6 it is a matter of judgment whether, in the light 
of the relevant facts, the defendant can be said to have had a fair 
opportunity to conform her behavior to the law.  In other words, the test 
of engaged capacity is a normative one which ultimately asks whether the 
individual should have had the relevant cognitive state of knowledge or 
awareness. 
Almost needless to say—though we must note this before we move 
on—this basic principle, or perhaps its association with engaged 
capacities, is itself quite often modified or diluted in practice.  First, 
criminal law can and does use different principles of attribution in 
relation to corporate entities,7 just as in the past it has applied different 
principles to individual human beings and indeed to animals.8  We might 
see the principles of corporate responsibility as extensions by analogy 
from the paradigm principles applied to individual human beings.  But 
this, I suggest, would be a mistake.  While we can certainly see the criteria 
of responsibility attribution as fulfilling broadly analogous legitimating 
and coordinating roles in relation to both individual and corporate 
criminal liability, we should see the criteria applied to corporations as 
relating directly to the functions of responsibility attribution in that 
context.  In other words, we should see it as concerned with the 
legitimation of criminalizing power in the light of its various aims and 
functions specifically in relation to corporations—and not as pale 
adaptations of a human paradigm.9  It follows that systems of criminal law 
typically deploy more than one conception of responsibility at any one 
time. 
 
6.  See HART, supra note 4. 
7.  CELIA WELLS, CORPORATIONS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (2d ed. 2001).  
8.  E.P. EVANS, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF 
ANIMALS (Faber & Faber Ltd. 1987) (1906); William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): 
What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889 (1995). 
9.  Nicola Lacey, “Philosophical Foundations of the Common Law”: Social Not 
Metaphysical, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 17 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000). 
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Second, and yet more fundamentally, criminal law in many systems, 
including those of the United States and England and Wales, quite 
standardly invokes patterns of attribution which modify the requirements 
set by the conception of responsibility as founded in fair opportunity 
through engaged capacities.  These supplementary patterns of attribution 
deploy a notion of responsibility founded merely in causal liability for 
prohibited outcomes, independent of any proof of capacity to avoid them, 
or even on occasion one founded in notions of bad or dangerous character 
or the presentation of a certain risk.10  I want to acknowledge the wide 
significance of these complementary patterns of responsibility 
attribution.  Much of my Article will be devoted to considering whether 
external factors bearing on the conditions of human agency undermine 
the criteria for responsibility understood in Hart’s sense—where the fair 
opportunity to conform one’s conduct to the precepts of criminal law is 
essentially regarded as lying in the engagement of key volitional and 
cognitive capacities.  But I shall return in the latter part of the lecture to 
consider how far the persistence and even resurgence of these 
complementary outcome, risk, or character-based patterns of 
attribution11 lend weight to my argument that practices of responsibility 
attribution in criminal law can only be understood in relation to the 
overall functions of criminalization and obligations of the state.   
III. EXTERNAL FACTORS AS UNDERMINING THE AUTONOMY OF THE 
SUBJECT OF CRIMINAL LAW SO AS TO CALL INTO QUESTION 
JUDGMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITY 
So how should external factors which undermine the autonomy or 
understanding of a subject affect our judgments about their criminal 
responsibility?  For the purposes of this section of my Article, I will 
concentrate on Hart’s vision of criminal responsibility as founded in the 
presence of adequately engaged volitional and cognitive capacities of self-
direction and understanding.12  Note that, as soon as one moves beyond 
the idea of the potentially competent subject of criminal law—the person 
whose possession of baseline capacities does not exempt her from 
criminal liability in itself—to the question of whether those capacities 
were adequately engaged in a relevant piece of conduct, the question of 
 
10.  See LACEY, IN SEARCH OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 3.  See generally 
NICOLA LACEY, WOMEN, CRIME, AND CHARACTER: FROM MOLL FLANDERS TO TESS OF 
THE D’URBERVILLES (2008). 
11.  On this reemergence, see LACEY, IN SEARCH OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra 
note 3, at ch. 5. 
12.  HART, supra note 4, at 13–14. 
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context immediately becomes relevant.  For this question of adequate 
engagement brings in the question of external factors bearing on the 
potentially responsible agent’s behavior, in a way which is belied by any 
reference to “the responsible subject of criminal law” as if this were 
something to be defined in terms of criteria independent of the context in 
which any particular putative offense is committed.  The question, in 
effect, is not whether someone was a responsible subject but whether her 
capacities for responsible agency were sufficiently fully and freely engaged 
in relation to the offense to justify a finding of liability.  In this part, I shall 
leave aside the enduring question of whether any human being can be 
said to have free will sufficient to say that she could genuinely have done 
otherwise than she did—a counterfactual which, as many commentators 
have observed, is impossible to test.  Rather, I shall rely on a broadly 
Strawsonian view of responsibility attribution as a practice of mutual 
human interpretation, based on perfectly rational—but also largely 
revisable—grounds and proceeding on the unstated basis that people 
enjoy certain powers of self-direction.13  There can be real sense, in other 
words, in a practice of responsibility attribution based on a mutual 
assumption of self-direction and agency irrespective of the extent to 
which the conditions of free will hold.  With that in mind, I shall move on 
to discuss some intuitively troubling cases for both volitional and 
cognitive conditions of responsibility attribution.   
A. Volitional Conditions 
Let us look first at the volitional condition.  A well-established 
panoply of defenses in criminal law addresses various volitional defects, 
subject to greater or lesser controversy or difficulty about line drawing.  
A certain degree of intoxication clearly undermines the power of self-
direction—and where this intoxication is involuntary, a cognitive defect 
is added to a volitional defect so as further to undermine the normal 
conditions of responsibility.14  Certain forms of mental incapacity—
extreme fear, distress or stress, rage, disorientation—can reduce or, in the 
term used in English law, “diminish” the normal conditions of 
responsibility, making it harder for us to direct our conduct so as to 
conform to the criminal law’s requirements.15  But these immediate, 
person- or context-specific, and rather vivid forms of volition-reducing 
 
13.  P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, 48 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 187 (1962). 
14.  ANDREW ASHWORTH & JEREMY HORDER, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW ch. 6 
(7th ed. 2013). 
15.  ALAN NORRIE, CRIME, REASON AND HISTORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO 
CRIMINAL LAW chs. 9 & 11 (3d ed. 2014). 
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external factors are supplemented by a far broader range of long-term, 
diffuse, and quotidian external influences which undoubtedly shape our 
capacities for self-direction and the extent to which we have a real 
opportunity to cultivate them through the course of our lives.  Consider 
the nature of a person’s education and socialization.  There can be no 
doubt that certain forms of upbringing and schooling are specifically 
oriented to encouraging and fostering the power of individual self-
direction via a process of rational deliberation, while others are designed 
to inculcate a more conventional conformity.  Indeed, much of what we 
now recognize as education is geared to this sort of process.  Most people 
are born, certainly, with some underlying potential to develop a capacity 
for self-direction, but the extent to which we ultimately enjoy it depends 
largely on the practices and norms which parents, educational 
institutions, and peers inculcate and communicate.  And for those 
brought up in highly disorganized contexts, the opportunities to cultivate 
these powers may well be systematically lower.  A certain conception of 
self-direction, in other words, is a culturally specific phenomenon, and 
moreover one which has to be achieved within the context of certain kinds 
of social institutions.   
Social sciences such as psychology, sociology, and anthropology have 
much to say about these questions of socialization and its impact on our 
capacities and self-conception.16  Much the same is true of another broad 
set of external factors which undoubtedly shape our volitional capacities 
to conform our behavior to criminal law: to wit, the material 
circumstances in which we find ourselves.  Though there are of course 
exceptional individuals, no fair-minded reader of an urban ethnography 
such as Alice Goffman’s On the Run17 or Sudhir Venkatesh’s Gang 
Leader for a Day,18 or of a novel such as Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man,19 
could conclude that those born into communities marked by multiple 
 
16.  The classic work drawing an explicit link between the capacity for self-control and 
crime is MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 
(1990).  Since its publication, debate has flourished in journals such as Criminal Justice and 
Behavior and the Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency not only about the link 
between levels of self-control and crime but also about the relevant contributions of, broadly 
speaking, biology and social factors to human capacities.  Suffice it to say that much of this 
literature provides compelling evidence of the shaping power of parenting practices and other 
environmental factors.  See, e.g., Travis C. Pratt, Michael G. Turner & Alex R. Piquero, 
Parental Socialization and Community Context: A Longitudinal Analysis of the Structural 
Sources of Low Self-Control, 41 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 219 (2004). 
17.  ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN AMERICAN CITY (2014). 
18.  SUDHIR VENKATESH, GANG LEADER FOR A DAY: A ROGUE SOCIOLOGIST TAKES 
TO THE STREETS (2008). 
19.  RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN (1952). 
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disadvantages produced by industrial decline, racism, poor housing, and 
high levels of surrounding violence have anything approaching the same 
opportunity to conform their conduct to the requirements of criminal law 
as those born into privileged communities and comfortable material 
conditions.  Indeed, many of the legal, as well as the de facto, 
disqualifications and knock-on effects of criminal conviction may make it 
exceptionally difficult to avoid further criminal offending, by closing off 
access to legitimate employment, housing, or basic life-qualifications such 
as a driving license.20  This is not to claim that, for example, violent crime 
committed in massively disadvantaged circumstances is justified or is in 
any way less serious a concern than it is in less constraining circumstances.  
But it is to claim that the normative question of how we should respond, 
legally, to this sort of behavior cannot be resolved by a simple appeal to 
a conceptual definition of “responsibility.”  For once we concede that 
responsibility itself is an issue of fair opportunity to conform, the question 
of how we evaluate that fairness is immediately in issue.  And this, as I 
shall argue—and as the late Victorian English judges who struggled with 
the notion of “moral insanity,” as well as judges who struggled with 
definitions of the insanity defense in American criminal law in the second 
half of the twentieth century,21 understood quite well—brings us face to 
face with questions about the social functions of criminal law.   
Modern judges have certainly found these broader circumstances 
troubling.  Just as their nineteenth-century ancestors feared that the 
notion of moral insanity would undermine integrity of criminal law’s 
prohibitions,22 so our judges worry that a defense of necessity in effect 
allows the defendant to substitute her own judgment about right and 
wrong for that of the criminal law.23  Hence their inclination—like their 
general resistance to justificatory defenses—is to distance this threat by 
confining the defense within an excusatory framework of “duress of 
circumstances.”24  This attempt to insulate the judgment of guilt from 
 
20.  See GOFFMAN, supra note 17; see also AMY E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, 
ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME 
CONTROL (2014); cf. MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE 
AMERICAN CITY (2016) (the consequences of involuntary homelessness). 
21.  In particular for a discussion in relation to Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 
(1954), see GREEN, supra note 1, at 219–29. 
22.  See LUCIA ZEDNER, WOMEN, CRIME, AND CUSTODY IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 
(1991). 
23.  See NORRIE, supra note 15, at 201–18; CELIA WELLS & OLIVER QUICK, LACEY, 
WELLS AND QUICK: RECONSTRUCTING CRIMINAL LAW TEXT AND MATERIALS 416–47 (4th 
ed. 2010).  
24.  WELLS & QUICK, supra note 23, at 416–47. 
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social context utilizes a distinction between justified acts and 
(exceptional) circumstances which excuse or mitigate the responsibility 
of actors.  In doing so, it construes the presence of shaping circumstances 
as “exceptional” and hence deploys the very assertion of the “normally” 
responsible subject’s autonomy from the social and from the context of 
external circumstances which I am questioning in this Article.  If the effect 
of external circumstances on substantially affecting opportunities to 
conform conduct to criminal law is “normal” rather than “exceptional,” 
the task of deciding where to draw the line around responsible 
subjecthood becomes considerably more complex, not only suggesting 
that individuals whose special difficulty in meeting legal standards itself 
derives from past injustice are being treated doubly unfairly but also 
raising questions about the adequacy of the general understanding of 
agency assumed by criminal law.25 
B. Cognitive Conditions 
Let me now turn to the cognitive conditions of responsibility.  In part 
because of the continuing fascination of the problem of free will, moral 
philosophers have been less preoccupied by the cognitive conditions than 
by the volitional conditions of responsibility.26  But criminal law theorists 
have long recognized the importance of questions about how far various 
forms of ignorance, mistake, or inattention should be regarded as 
undermining the conditions of responsibility.27  At first blush, one might 
simply assume that responsibility is ruled out wherever the agent is 
unconscious or unaware of directly relevant circumstances or 
consequences impinging on her actions.  And, of course, neuroscientific 
and psychological evidence has now given us a much more precise 
 
25.  See generally Delgado, supra note 1.  Delgado’s article has since stimulated a lively 
and often contentious debate among both lawyers and philosophers.  See, e.g., Morse, Severe 
Environmental Deprivation, supra note 1; Morse, Deprivation and Desert, supra note 1; 
Robinson, supra note 1. 
26.  For an honorable exception, see R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY: PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 159–67 (1990).  The 
relationship between consciousness and agency is also discussed in NEIL LEVY, 
CONSCIOUSNESS AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (2014); MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND 
CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1993); 
MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP (1984); 
JOSEPH RAZ, FROM NORMATIVITY TO RESPONSIBILITY pt. 3 (2011); GEORGE SHER, WHO 
KNEW? RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT AWARENESS (2009); Michael S. Moore, Responsibility 
and the Unconscious, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1563, 1564–76 (1980). 
27.  For a philosophical analysis of this issue, see MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC 
INJUSTICE: POWER AND THE ETHICS OF KNOWING (2007); Angela M. Smith, Control, 
Responsibility and Moral Assessment, 138 PHIL. STUD. 367 (2008); Angela Smith, Responsibility 
for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life, 115 ETHICS 236 (2005). 
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appreciation of what degree of knowledge, awareness, or consciousness 
is present under specific circumstances.  Yet here again, the idea that the 
relevant lines can be drawn by attending to either a pre-formed concept 
of the responsible subject or the psychological or neurological facts of the 
matter proves to be illusory.28  For example, while both English and 
American law often hold that an honest mistake, which means that the 
defendant lacked the mens rea required for the offense, precludes 
liability, they yet more often hold that mistakes invoked to underpin 
defenses—mistaken self-defense, for example—must be based on 
reasonable grounds if they are to be regarded as undermining a fair 
opportunity to conform one’s behavior to the law.29  And here again, we 
find ourselves confronted with the question of how the law should try to 
assess the impact of background conditions on a subject’s fair opportunity 
to engage her capacities of cognition.  Indeed, in extreme cases, it may 
even raise questions about the very existence of those capacities. 
To see why this might be the case, let us take a very topical issue: that 
of the so-called cultural defense.  In essence, the claim in some cultural 
defense cases relies on the proposition that the defendant apprehended 
the world differently because of his or her specific background.30  So, just 
as someone who has been a long-term victim of domestic violence may 
interpret other people’s behavior in that light, potentially making it more 
likely that she will engage in acts of mistaken self-defense, so someone 
socialized in a homophobic culture to believe that homosexuals are 
sexually predatory, or in a racist culture which holds that certain ethnic 
groups are more prone to violence, may be more likely to misinterpret 
non-aggressive behavior as aggressive and to retaliate on the basis of this 
misapprehension.  Though not often thought about within the framework 
of cultural defense, the same can be said of the very standard defense in 
rape cases consisting in a claim of honest belief in the victim’s consent—
mistakes about consent being clearly more likely among those brought up 
to believe that women are prone to dissimulate or to lie about their 
preferences because of conventions about female modesty, stereotypes 
about their unreliability, or otherwise.31  While some such defenses are 
doubtless disingenuous, it seems quite clear that socialization within a 
 
28.  See Lacey, Responsibility Without Consciousness, supra note 3. 
29.  See ASHWORTH & HORDER, supra note 14, at 215–18. 
30.  Nicola Lacey, Community, Culture, and Criminalization, in CRIME, PUNISHMENT 
AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ANTONY DUFF 292 (Rowan Cruft, Matthew 
H. Kramer & Mark R. Reiff eds., 2011), reprinted in modified form in CRIMINAL LAW & 
CULTURAL DIVERSITY (Will Kymlicka, Claes Lernestedt & Matt Matravers eds., 2014). 
31.  See id. 
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certain set of norms or expectations changes the way in which we 
apprehend the world and, in particular, interpret each other’s behavior.  
Moreover, even small changes in perception can have radical and grave 
implications.  But pure miscognition, while being a relevant fact and one 
step towards an analysis of responsibility, cannot in itself answer the 
question of whether someone should be held responsible in criminal law. 
The relevance of miscognition to the problem of criminal 
responsibility is underlined by a phenomenon on which research in 
cognitive psychology and the philosophy of mind is shedding ever greater 
light: that of the implicit biases, attendant on our experience and 
socialization, which are now known to shape our apprehension of the 
world and, often, our consequent behavior on a very standard basis.32  
Various forms of implicit bias are now used as a partial basis for the 
attribution of liability in civil law, notably in indirect or disparate impact 
discrimination cases.33  And in our moral and political lives, there is a 
lively debate about whether unexamined, implicit biases based on 
assumptions about sex, gender, sexuality, race, or religion should be 
regarded as on an ethical par with discriminatory behavior based on 
conscious prejudice.  And implicit bias is at the root of many of the cases 
which I have just compared to situations of potential cultural defense.  
The psychological research can leave us in no doubt of the fact that 
socialization into certain pervasive implicit biases—notably on the basis 
of sex, sexuality, and race—is likely fundamentally to shape subjects’ 
interpretation of other people’s behavior.  This consequently affects both 
people’s propensity (as police officers, prosecutors, judges, or jurors) to 
label behavior as criminal and, as potential defendants, the likelihood of 
their misreading behavior in a way which encourages them to engage in 
potentially criminal conduct.34  But, once again, this fact does not in itself 
conclude the core matter, which is whether the fairness of the defendant’s 
opportunity to conform her behavior to the criminal law has been 
 
32.  Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Attitudes and Beliefs Adapt to Situations: A Decade of 
Research on the Malleability of Implicit Prejudice, Stereotypes, and the Self-Concept, 47 
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34.  For a variety of studies illustrating the power of implicit bias in different contexts, see 
Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Auditions 
on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715 (2000); Daniel Kelly & Erica Roedder, Racial 
Cognition and the Ethics of Implicit Bias, 3 PHIL. COMPASS 522 (2008); Kristin A. Lane et al., 
Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427 (2007); see also LEVY, supra 
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compromised to the extent that criminalization cannot be justified.  And 
the answer to this question turns both on the overall rationale for 
criminalization and on two further issues.  First, there is an empirical 
question about how far subjects are capable of articulating, confronting, 
and revising their implicit biases when prompted to do so by third parties 
or even by introspection—a question on which there is much debate.35  
Second, there is a normative question about whether the state, in whose 
name an attribution of criminal responsibility and criminal judgment is 
made, has carried out its own obligations.  These arguably include a duty 
to create an environment inimical to the development of prejudices on 
the grounds of factors such as race, class, sex, or religion and to counter 
such prejudices, through the education system, the law, and elsewhere, 
where they nonetheless arise. 
To sum up my argument so far: in terms of the fulfillment of both the 
volitional and the cognitive criteria for criminal responsibility, a wide 
range of diffuse social, external factors bears directly and indirectly on 
the opportunity which defendants have had to conform their behavior to 
the standards set by criminal law.  It would be simply irrational to claim 
that these causal factors are irrelevant to the assessment of their 
responsibility.  And, as work in the cognitive sciences proceeds apace, 
more and more of it is becoming available.  But, on the other hand, it is 
equally clear that, however rich this information, it does not determine 
the question of responsibility: that of whether a particular defendant’s 
conduct fell so far short of what we could reasonably have expected of 
her in a certain context that she can be said to have had a fair opportunity 
to conform, and that the imposition of criminal liability is accordingly 
justified.  So how should the facts bearing on the causal background to 
our actions and the judgments about our degree of responsibility for those 
actions be combined? 
IV. RESOLVING THE ISSUE 
The first step towards resolving this apparent dilemma consists, I 
would argue, in recognizing that the constitution of the responsible 
subject takes place within different domains of social action, and that 
 
35.  For an elegant account of the issues and a persuasive elaboration of the reasons to 
think that subjects can, at least under certain circumstances, revise their implicit biases—and 
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Holroyd, Implicit Bias, Awareness and Imperfect Cognitions, 33 CONSCIOUSNESS & 
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these domains—legal, moral, political, professional, or other—fulfill 
distinctive social functions and are imbued with distinctive values and 
ideals.  We can, certainly, identify a broad notion of responsible agency 
which is being invoked across normative and practical fields such as 
morality, criminal and civil law, professional codes of conduct, and so on.  
But we should not assume that the responsible subject will take just the 
same form within each of them.36  Rather, each of these fields constructs 
requirements for responsible agency distinctive to its own protocols and 
to what it requires from a notion of responsibility by way of the 
legitimation of its deployment of power and the coordination of the 
knowledge and information relevant to its judgments.  And these 
requirements, I argue, are shaped by the distinctive social functions of 
these different domains.  Hence the aims and rationale of criminalization 
are fundamental to the way in which criminal law understands and, 
conceptually, constructs its subjects.  And this encompasses not only a 
society’s view of what criminal law is for but also its view of the proper 
relationship between the individual and the state and of whether the state 
has done as much as it reasonably can to counteract environmental 
factors which, by fostering implicit biases or entrenching social 
disadvantages, produce a radically unequal distribution of opportunities 
to conform to criminal law. 
The contemporary notion of the subject of criminal law as a 
psychological agent is, after all, itself a distinctively modern creation, its 
history intimately linked with the emergence of modern projects of 
governance committed to both ambitious programs of social regulation 
and broadly liberal notions of government.37  This combination at once 
posed a distinctively challenging legitimation problem for criminal law, 
with the direct implication being the idea that the state’s criminalizing 
power should be invoked only in response to responsible conduct in a 
robust psychological sense.  Conversely, however, the regulatory 
ambitions of the modern state implied that the costs of proving that form 
of responsibility might be regarded as prohibitively high, in terms of 
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either process costs or a sacrifice in efficacy.  This broadly explains why 
even systems such as the American and British ones, quite firmly attached 
to individualist liberal ideals, have long tempered (particularly in the area 
of so-called regulatory crime) their criminal law’s construction of the 
responsible subject whose knowledge, awareness, and capacity for self-
control underpinned her liability with a thinner conception of 
responsibility as based on the causation of proscribed outcomes.38  
Particularly where a harmful outcome eventuates from the pursuit of a 
hazardous activity from which the defendant derives some benefit—
driving a car, running a business—the criminal law’s regulatory purposes 
indicate that a higher standard of conduct be set.  This thinner sense of 
outcome or risk-based responsibility has been brought into some measure 
of conformity with the precept that subjects should have a fair 
opportunity to conform their conduct to the criminal law by the 
application of due diligence defenses providing that defendants who have 
taken all reasonable measure to avoid causing the relevant harm should 
escape liability.  But these defenses are not invariant, and even the most 
liberal of systems on occasion imposes more absolute or strict forms of 
responsibility.  How can this be understood, and how can it be justified? 
In attempting to resolve these questions, I think that some insight can 
be derived from the so-called “mixed” theories of punishment.39  These 
theories acknowledge that, in the context of the practical business of 
criminalization, important values of fairness and justice have to be 
interpreted in the light of the equally important goals of the criminal 
process in underpinning the integrity of the norms of the criminal law.  It 
may be that, as H.L.A. Hart famously put it, offenses of strict liability—
like other institutional mechanisms such as the modification of burdens 
or standards of proof—are imposed with a sense that an important 
principle—the principle of fairness—is being modified or, in Hart’s terms, 
“sacrificed.”40  Such a tradeoff would probably be handled in a very 
different way in a purely moral context.  But the criminal law is a practical 
activity, with its conception—or, more accurately, its conceptions—of 
responsibility being inevitably shaped by its practical goals41: while for 
certain very serious offenses an analogy with purely moral 
communication may be apposite, contrary to what some influential 
 
38.  See LACEY, IN SEARCH OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 3, at ch. 2. 
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40.  HART, supra note 3, at 20. 
41.  LACEY, IN SEARCH OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 3. 
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commentators (like Antony Duff) have argued,42 this cannot be assumed 
to be the case for vast swaths of the territory of criminal law.  
But this does not, it should be emphasized, imply that there are no 
normative limits on how, and on the conditions under which, subjects can 
and should be held accountable to the criminal courts.  What it does imply 
is that these limits are ones which must speak to the practical concerns of 
law itself and to the background obligations of the state.  Most criminal 
law theorists, after all, accept that they are in the business of providing 
the best possible account of the justification of criminalization as it 
currently exists as a social practice.  And this justification, far from 
existing, prefabricated, in some metaphysical moral universe, is a matter 
of social judgment and interpretation.  And here, as both Duff43 and 
Braithwaite and Pettit44—authors of the most sophisticated mixed 
theories of punishment—rightly argue, while the overall meaning and 
function of the criminal process may sanction certain compromises, its 
need, in a liberal polity, to establish itself as a legitimate exercise of state 
power means that there are constraints internal to the functions of the 
criminal process on how criminalizing power may be exercised.  
Hence the question of whether failures of education, socialization, or 
other external factors undermine the basis of a subject’s fair opportunity 
to conform his behavior to criminal law, and hence an attribution of 
criminal responsibility, depends not only upon an assessment of the 
capacities of particular individuals but also upon a fundamentally political 
interpretation of the relationship between individual and state and of the 
functions of the criminal process.  It depends, at root, on whether we see 
the functions of criminal law primarily in terms of desert, blame, and 
stigmatization; or whether we believe that criminal law and its 
surrounding processes should aspire to foster positive goals such as 
integration, reform, and even forgiveness—aspirations which surely 
depend on a realistic as well as a respectful attempt to understand the 
background to offending behavior.  When we see changes in the balance 
of responsibility attribution—with recent moves in both the American 
and English systems towards an expansion of some of the attenuated 
forms of character- or outcome-based liability—this tells us something 
important, and perhaps something worrying, about the changing 
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functions of criminal law in our societies.  For it seems to betoken a turn 
to a vision of criminal law as based on stigmatization, blame, and cost-
reduction, as well as a weakening of the internal constraints set by the 
demands of legitimation where civil libertarian sentiments are robust.  
Where we draw the line around responsible subjecthood—what we 
regard as a fair opportunity to conform—is, of course, open to moral and 
political criticism.  But that critique must be based on an explicit defense 
of certain moral and political values, rather than an appeal to an asocial 
concept of the responsible subject.  
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW THEORY  
To sum up: I have argued that our conception of criminal 
responsibility—of what it is and of why it matters—is and must be shaped 
by what criminal responsibility is for: by its own functions of legitimating 
criminalizing power and of coordinating the facts and evaluations on 
which such criminalization is founded.  Criminal responsibility, in short, 
is a product of not merely ideas but of ideas whose realization depends 
on institutional structures which in turn shape them, and by vectors of 
power and interest which shape both ideas and institutions.  This implies 
that criminal law theory should not confine its attention to the resources 
of philosophy.  Certainly, both moral and political philosophy, as well as 
the philosophy of mind, can sharpen our appreciation of how ideas of 
agency and responsibility have been understood, and these ideas most 
certainly find some expression in systems of criminal law.  But to 
understand how and why they do so, we need to turn our attention to both 
history, which illuminates the development of ideas over time, and the 
social sciences, which shed light on the role of criminal law and 
criminalization in the broader project of governance and in the 
production of social order.  And this in turn implies that our analysis of 
criminal responsibility must be located firmly within an account of the 
rationale for the social practice of criminalization within a broadly liberal 
polity.  The subject of criminal law is, inevitably, socialized; so, therefore, 
must be our criminal law scholarship. 
